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A reply to O. Bonnet et al. (2014)
“The bold statement ‘Housing wealth isn’t wealth’ was put to
me over a decade ago by Mervyn King...”
 Buiter (2010)
“... Like most bold statements, the assertion is not quite correct;
the correct statement is that, in a representative agent model,
a decline in house prices does create a negative wealth effect
on aggregate consumption demand. On average, consumers
are neither worse off nor better off.” 
Buiter (2010)
“These vagabond shoes, are longing to stray 
Right through the very heart of it, New York, New York.
I wanna wake up, In that city that doesn't sleep.
And find I'm king of the hill, top of the heap.
These little town blues, are melting away.
I'll make a brand new start of it, in old New York.”
Fred Ebb, Theme from New York, New York
In Capital in the 21st century (hereafter Capital), Thomas Piketty points out
the risk of a concentration of wealth in the twenty-first century that would
threaten the social justice and meritocratic values of our democratic societies.
The main force of divergence is due to the fact that net returns on capital (r) are
expected to be greater than the growth of the economy (g), or: “r>g”.
According to Piketty, this will lead to two undesirable consequences: firstly,
wealth will have a tendency to concentrate in the hands of a few; secondly,
constituted wealth will tend to dominate accumulated wealth from labour:
“the past devours the future”.
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Guillaume Allègre et Xavier TimbeauIn a comment on Piketty’s Capital, Odran Bonnet, Pierre-Henri Bono,
Guillaume Chapelle and Etienne Wasmer (hereafter the authors) attempt to show
that the conclusion of the book in terms of the explosion of wealth inequality is
not plausible. They point out what they see as an inconsistency in the thesis:
according to the authors, the capital accumulation model used by Piketty is a
model of accumulation of productive capital, which is inconsistent with the
choice to use housing market prices to measure housing capital. To correctly
measure housing capital, one should use rent and not housing prices. By doing
this, the authors conclude that capital/income ratios have remained stable in
France, Britain, the United States and Canada, which contradicts the thesis of
Piketty. The authors share some of the conclusions of our own review of Piketty’s
Capital (Allègre and Timbeau, 2014). The return on housing capital has also been
pointed by Yglesias (2014). However, we believe that the authors minimize the
contribution of housing to the rising inequality of wealth. In particular, we do not
agree with their conclusion that the increase in housing prices has effects which
are of a second order (redistributive effects) and are mitigated” (p.9). 1 As usual, the
disagreement is in part due to a lack of consensus on what really matters when
discussing inequality: wealth inequality or income inequality or consumption
inequality? We emphasize a theoretical inconsistency in the authors’ main argu-
ment. In fact, they value housing capital as the sum of the present values of
rents, under the assumption that what matters is the housing service, then they
use a dynastic model in which what matters is the transmission of wealth and not
the discounted value of the housing service.
In short, our conclusion is that with regard to inequality, housing wealth is in
fact wealth and should be measured in a manner consistent with the measure of
other types of wealth. 
In very short, Piketty 1 – Authors 0.
Should we care about inequality of income? 
“The value of housing capital must be based on rents, not on housing prices”
(p. 4). The authors recommend evaluating housing capital using the rents of
dwellings rather than their market prices. This is surprising because evaluating
capital using market prices is relatively standard practice in economics. As the
authors point out, it is the convention adopted by national accounts. If one
believes in the informative role of prices in a market economy, one must have a
good reason to deviate from this standard. Although it is not explicitly explained
in these terms, the authors seem to argue that for inequality, what really matters
is income and not wealth per se. The authors write: “The rise of housing capital
does not imply a rise in the returns in capital. Quite the contrary” (p. 6) and
“Housing prices are therefore disconnected from the share of income from housing in
national income” (p. 7, underlined by us).
1. Quotes and page numbers are from Bonnet et al..2 briefing paper no. 9/January 8, 2015
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then writing a book on capital does not have much of an interest besides an
historical one. Changes in the value of capital are of no consequence as long as
the flow of income received by the owners is unchanged. However, rent is not
the only motivation for becoming an owner (otherwise, it is hard to understand
why people still buy at today’s market price). If other benefits are derived from
ownership (insurance, social position), or if tax rules favor homeownership
(which is the case in many countries), a rough calculation based on discounted
future rents misses out what motivates ownership, which, precisely, might be
revealed in asset prices. The authors admit, however, that capital plays a role, but
only of second order. Yet they also write: “However, we would like to make it very
clear that we do not deny that the rise in housing price has had real consequences on
access to housing and inequality. It has had bona fide consequences on the wealth
trajectories of individuals and dynasties: in particular, it is increasingly difficult for an
individual without initial wealth to become a homeowner in France” (p. 3-4). They
point out that, “The increase in housing prices creates an insurance against social
risks for owners: in case of money problems, it is possible to sell the property and
become a tenant” (p. 9) and, in the French version of the discussion paper, they
mention the possibility of using capital as a collateral. Access to homeownership,
insurance against social risk, collateral, inheritance: it seems difficult to qualify all
these aspects of capital as “second order” without further demonstration.
More importantly, although it is a fact that housing prices are disconnected
from the share of rents (including imputed rents) in national income, rents are
not the only source of income derived from homeownership. The authors seem
to neglect capital gains. Correctly measured, household income should include
capital gains. Hicks (1946) defined income as “the maximum value which [a
person] can consume during a week, and still expect to be as well at the end of
the week as he was in the beginning”. If we use Hicks’ definition of income,
(“true”) income then equals consumption plus variation of wealth: 2 
I = C + dW
Capital gains therefore should be included in the definition of household
income, as they allow future consumption. Figure 1 shows at the macroeco-
nomic level the importance in France of capital gains relative to labour income
and fixed income from property. If what counts is income, then one should not
forget capital gains. 
2. See Weiztman (2000) for a comprehensive presentation and discussion of the hypotheses needed for
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To answer the problem of capital gains, the authors suggest implicitly that
what counts is not wealth nor income but consumption. Capital gains exist but
“most capital gains are used by sellers, not to consume more, but to buy a new
dwelling” (p. 7, underlined by us). The main idea of the authors is that a rise in
price of housing does not imply a rise in real consumption so it does not really
matter in the first order. The authors use an intuition from Buiter (2010) whom
they cite: housing wealth is different from financial wealth because people use
housing services, and plan to use them in their remaining lifetime. People have to
fulfill these housing needs whereas they don’t have any “corporate stock” or
“corporate bond” need. The authors cite the literature on wealth effects,
including Buiter (2010): according to this literature, a rise in housing prices does
not have a real effect on consumption of other goods. Only “if there is a housing
bubble, there are real effects on consumption due to distortions. These effects are of a
second order however...” (p. 2). This is however a serious misinterpretation of this
literature and the consequences of this absence of wealth effect on consumption.
Indeed, this literature studies aggregate consumption but says nothing about
inequality. What Buiter (2010) writes is that, concerning the (macro) wealth
effect, housing wealth isn’t wealth; more precisely, a rise in the fundamental
value of housing isn’t a rise in wealth. However, Buiter uses a representative
agent model: one cannot make inferences on inequality dynamics using a model
in which everybody is equal (and only the fate of the representative one is
studied). Basically, what Buiter says is that if everyone live in their own house for
ever, then variations of housing prices have strictly no impact on consumption
Figure 1. Real labour incomes, real fixed income from capital & real capital gains, 
France 1979-2009
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Source: Allègre et al., 2012.
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007
Financial capital gains
Rents 
(including imputed)
Residential capital gain (minus inflation tax)
Financial assets income
Labor income4 briefing paper no. 9/January 8, 2015
Does housing wealth contribute to wealth inequality?and well-being. The authors add that this remains true in a world where there are
owners and tenants but where houses are sold only to buy new houses. Then, the
real price of houses is always 1: rising nominal prices are “in part an illusion”
(p. 11). This is an interesting intuition, but how does it help us think about
inequalities in the real world? The argument of the authors can be summed up as
follow: if we consider that households receive a dwelling from their parents, and
live in it during their entire life – or exchange it against other dwellings – then the
evolution of prices will have no real effect. In their conclusion, the authors try to
clarify this line of reasoning:
To better see this point, let us ask two questions. First, what inequality
would there be if each household owned one painting and kept it
throughout its lifetime? The wealthiest households might own a pricey
Manet or Kandinsky. The poorest might own a painting by a local artist.
Now, if the price of art increased uniformly, would this contribute to an
explosion of inequality in the sense of a divergent and exponential accu-
mulation of capital? The answer is clearly it would not.
This comparison does not really nail the argument. Of course, if art prices
increased proportionally, it would contribute to an increase in inequality in the
common sense of the sentence. If a Manet is worth 10 million euros and a local
painter 1,000 euros (these are the magnitudes of the art market), a doubling of
art prices would increase the wealth of the holders of a Manet by 10 million
euros and the wealth of the holders of a local painter by 1,000 euros. The only
reason why inequalities of consumption do not increase in the fable above is
because households are supposed to keep their painting during their lifetime and
are supposed to be receiving a constant flow of well-being from the painting, no
matter what it is worth on an international art market (the reason why they do
not sell if their well-being is constant despite a doubling in price remains a
mystery). But, even if we accept these premises, some children will receive an
additional 10 million euros in value whereas other children will receive an addi-
tional 1,000 euros (if they recognize the value of the painting and don’t sell it in
a garage sale). Thanks to the magic of free exchange, if the first children do not
value the benefit of holding a Manet at 20 million euros, they can sell and do
what they want with the money. Even if they decide to hold it, it is difficult to
conclude that inequality has not risen with the doubling in art prices. The same
happens with housing: individuals do not generally sell their housing to consume
capital gains. However, if they do not consume their capital gains, they transfer
those gains to their children through bequests. In France, people receive
bequests at an average age of around 60 whereas they acquire houses at around
40. Moreover, individuals whose parents are homeowners have a greater chance
of being themselves homeowners: their housing service is already met and they
can sell the dwelling they inherited for their own consumption. On the other
hand, if housing prices rise, individuals who do not inherit a dwelling need to
decrease their consumption if they want to become owners: rising housing prices
therefore have real effects on consumption inequality through at least unequal
bequests, although they might not have any effect on aggregate consumption.
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again a dynastic framework: “If a young successor inherits an amount of money
coming from the sale of a housing good and buys another housing good by means of
this legacy, it is the same as if prices had not increased. Here again, the real price of
housing is 1 if we think in terms of dynasties” (p. 9). But the world where the price
of housing is always 1 is fantasy. In the real word, dwellings are not always
bought with other dwellings, and those who want to work in New York City,
London or Paris do not necessarily have parents who are homeowners in these
cities. Even a proportional increase in house prices has real effects, because you
do not buy an apartment in New York City, NY by selling ten houses in little New
York, TX (there is only one house in New York in Texas, see below). Similarly,
nobody buys a Manet by selling 10,000 paintings by local artists. If housing
prices double, the absolute difference in prices between a dwelling in New York,
NY and one in New York, TX doubles as well, and this absolute difference can be
very important. 
There is a big difference between Manet paintings and homes: regular people
do not need an original painting from Manet in their living room, whereas
they need housing services. The entire reason why housing wealth isn’t wealth
(in a macroeconomic representative agent model) is lost in the comparison
with paintings. 
Moreover, one can highlight a theoretical inconsistency in the arguments of
the authors. According to the authors, the value of housing capital is the actual-
ized value of rent under the assumption that what counts in terms of well-being
is the housing service (valued at the market price of this consumption). But then,
they use a dynastic model in which what matters is the transmission of owner-
ship. This dynastic model is indeed justified by the low elasticity of consumption
to the increase in property prices. However, in a dynastic model (where individ-
uals try to maximize the discounted sum of utilities of their dynasty), the lack of
New York, TX vs. New York, NY
Left: The only house in little New York, TX. Right: Aerial view of New York, NY. In a world with
mobility, homeowners 
In New York, NY have more to gain from a doubling of all housing prices than the homeowner
in New York, TX.6 briefing paper no. 9/January 8, 2015
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is the transmission of the property, not the mere possibility of housing. Other-
wise, they would consume the bubble value at the expense of future generations.
Obviously, what matters for these dynasties is not the mere housing service.
Otherwise, there would not be any bubbles: if prices diverged from their funda-
mental value, a utility-maximizing dynasty would sell immediately. The existence
of a divergence between market price and “fundamental price” (the actualized
rents the authors try to measure) proves that ownership, and not just housing
services, matters to individuals (which should be obvious to anyone who ever
attended a dinner party in London, Paris or New York). If ownership obviously
matters to individuals, it does not appear legitimate to use a normative frame-
work where ownership does not matter in order to “correct” prices from a
market-based evaluation. Less than 10% of the residential stock is exchanged
every year and probably a large share is held for a long period of time. Applying
market prices to that stock brings a lot of issues (one of them being quality
correction) but still conveys a lot of information about the value agreed by
sellers, buyers and bankers.
Should we care about the explosive dynamics 
of inequality? 
Rising housing prices obviously increase income inequality (when capital gains
are included) as well as consumption inequality (mostly through inheritance),
which the authors concede but minimize. The authors argue that this does not
contribute to the explosive dynamics of inequality and is therefore inconsistent
with Piketty’s thesis that r>g will produce an explosive dynamics of inequality.
First, Piketty’s thesis is not that inequality is explosive, so the authors partly use a
straw man argument.3 Piketty is very clear that there are converging and
diverging factors to inequality and that divergence is not without limit: he never
defends the idea that capital income will make up anything near 100% of
national income, or that capital/income ratios will explode. The consequences of
r>g are not that apocalyptic, which does not mean that they are not serious.
Although Piketty does not discuss divergent forces in housing capital per se, we
can discuss them here using his dynamic presentation.
The authors argue that there is not a dynamic toward housing inequality,
pointing out that the proportion of owners has risen continuously between 1950
and 2006. However, this is totally consistent with Piketty’s theory. The data in
the book do tell another story: wealth inequality is today at a historic low point in
3. Piketty (2015) makes it especially clear that r-g does not imply an explosive dynamic of inequality:
“A central property of this large class of models is that for a given structure of shocks, the long-run
magnitude of wealth inequality will tend to be magnified if the gap r-g is higher. In other words, wealth
inequality will converge towards a finite level (…) But this finite inequality level will be a steeply rising
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dict the book’s own theory.   
In fact, until 1999, housing returns were relatively low (Figure 3). Following
Piketty’s theory, one does not expect any divergence before that date. It is only
between 1999 and 2008 that returns, including capital gains, were particularly
high (Timbeau, 2013). 
Might these high returns constitute a force of divergence in terms of
inequality? Our answer is yes. In the 1950s, housing ownership was not highly
correlated with income: it was best explained by socio-demographic factors:
older people and independent workers, including farmers, were more often
owners. This is explained by the fact that from an economic perspective it was
equivalent to be a tenant or an owner, notably because fiscal rules did not favor
ownership. For example, imputed rents of owner-occupiers were taxable until
1965. This was abandoned because of high administrative costs and low returns
(Driant and Jacquot, 2005). First, high housing capital gains do not create an
increase in the concentration of capital since they are shared between all owners
along the income scale. However, the inequality between owners and non-
owners increases: the weight of inheritance flows, which are very unevenly
shared, increases. The divergence described in Piketty’s book takes place in a
latter period. As prices rise, homeownership becomes more difficult for the
working classes because of credit constraints. Access to ownership is then
increasingly correlated with income and with whether one’s parents are owners
(but both factors are increasingly correlated as well). Ownership becomes
increasingly a closed club for the wealthy. If the returns on housing capital
remain high, then nothing prevents divergence.  
Figure 2. Capital in the 21st century shows that wealth inequality has fallen in France. 
Rising inequality is a prediction for the 21st century
The top decile (the top 10% highest wealth holders) owns 80-90% of total wealth in 1810-1910,
and 60-65% today.
Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.8 briefing paper no. 9/January 8, 2015
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Piketty’s analysis of the consequences of r>g is in fact trivial. Contrary to what
the authors write, it is not based on a particular growth model. If r>g, then
excess income (r-g) is either consumed, which leads to an inequality in consump-
tion, or saved and passed to the children, which leads to inequalities in terms of
unequal inheritance. Concerning housing, if r>g is due to capital gains, it prob-
ably leads mostly to unequal inheritance (and greater consumption of housing
services). However it is not right to make the problem disappear as in a magic
trick. In a trick, the card is always on the side of the hand not visible to the
public. Similarly, to make their case, when discussing income or consumption
inequality, the authors hide the problem of capital gains and unequal inheri-
tance. When capital gains and inheritance reappear in the discussion, they are
treated as second-order problems, but this is exactly where the trick lies: with
regard to inequality, they are in fact first-order problems, as we have shown in
this discussion. 
In a dynastic perspective, if r>g, with r being the net returns on capital after
taxes including inheritance taxation, then the descendants of the current owners
of capital will be able to consume r-g forever, without any additional work or
effort, which is a problem in a society that defines itself as meritocratic. The issue
is therefore not whether r>g has harmful consequences or not: socially, it is
clearly not desirable that net returns on capital be permanently higher than
growth. Piketty demonstrates that such returns are unfair under generally
accepted principles of justice (see the discussion on inherited wealth, and
Rastignac’s dilemma, especially the figures in Chapter 11). As Piketty argues, if
Figure 3. Returns from housing capital
     In %
Source: Timbeau, 2013.
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the future. 
The question is therefore not whether r>g is a problem or not, but whether
this relation is likely to continue in the future and in what way public policy can
modify it. We believe that there are forces in housing that push towards r>g,
precisely because housing, like other types of capital, is not purely productive. As
noted in our review, the inequality r>g is according to us the symptom of a situa-
tion where there is some form of rent-extraction (Allègre and Timbeau, 2014).
The mechanisms are the same as those that help to maintain the robustness
of housing bubbles: “by their local representation (they vote), by their ability to
contest (they may oppose real estate projects using different types of actions), resi-
dents have instruments to protect their land rents and therefore increase the value of
their inheritance” (Timbeau, 2013). In our review, we conclude that we must also
fight these mechanisms. Taxing capital (and inheritance) is necessary but prob-
ably not sufficient. At a sufficiently high level such taxes would surely be rejected,
even by the owners of houses near little New York, TX, perhaps at the expense of
their children. Children usually have life projects that differ from the ones their
parents have for them: they might have little town blues and not plan to live in
the family home eternally, looking their entire lives at the same painting by the
local painter. In that case, wealth matters – not wealth in purchasing power
parity, not wealth “correctly measured” (which for housing is always 1), but
wealth at market value.      
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